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Abstract
We develop a model of the political consequences of public income volatility. As is standard,
political incentives create ineﬃcient policies, but we show that making income uncertain creates
specific new eﬀects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy more
eﬃcient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent and
since some of the policy ineﬃciencies are concentrated in the future, this makes ineﬃcient policy
less costly. We show how this model can help think about the connection between volatility and
economic growth and in the case where volatility comes from volatile natural resource prices,
a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself is a source of
ineﬃcient resource extraction.
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1 Introduction
The literature on the political economy of public policy has discovered many mechanisms through
which the equilibrium policy chosen through a political process deviates from that which is
socially desirable. This is true even in simple models where the median voter theorem applies
when median and mean income diﬀer (Romer, 1975, Roberts, 1977). In models where elections
are modelled more explicitly many types of ineﬃciencies stem from the fact that incumbent
politicians have an incentive to move policy away from what is socially desirable either because
the probability of losing power makes them discount the future too much (Alesina and Tabellini,
1990a,b, Leblanc, Snyder, and Tripathi, 1990), or because this allows them to manipulate their
re-election probability in a favorable way (Aghion and Bolton, 1990, Besley and Coate, 1998,
Biais and Perotti, 2002, Robinson and Torvik, 2005, Robinson and Verdier, 2013).
These models tend to have simple and appealing comparative statics. For example, anything
which increases the benefits of being in power or holding oﬃce tends to make policy less eﬃcient.
Anything which makes the election outcome less sensitive to policy, such as changes in the
distribution of shocks in a probabilistic voting model, tends to make policy more eﬃcient.
In this paper we develop a model of what to our knowledge is a new type of comparative
static in a canonical political economy model of ineﬃcient policy. For standard reasons policy
is set ineﬃciently because this helps to raise the re-election probability of an incumbent. In the
specific set-up we use, society is divided into two groups one associated with an incumbent, one
with an opponent. The two groups value diﬀerent sorts of public goods which gives the members
of a particular groups a desire to elect their politician since only then will they benefit from the
public goods that he and they value. In addition the incumbent uses patronage employment,
which is socially ineﬃcient, to induce voters to support him.
The main innovation is to embed this model into an environment where government revenues
are stochastic and future revenues, after re-election, are uncertain. We show that this has
interesting implications for both the re-election probability and the eﬃciency of policy. More
specifically, uncertainly about future government income has important consequences for the
eﬃciency of policy. This works through two main channels. On the one hand uncertainly about
future government income tends to reduce the expected benefit of being in power to an incumbent
which makes policy more eﬃcient. On the other hand, when revenues and future public good
provision are uncertain, the continuation expected utility that members of an incumbents group
get from him being re-elected is lower and this reduces his re-election probability. When the
re-election probability is lower, this makes ineﬃcient policy less costly, since some of the costs
are concentrated in the future, thus encouraging it. We show that this latter eﬀect dominates
when the incumbent politician is from the group which values public goods highest and when
preferences for public goods are suﬃciently heterogeneous between groups or if public sector
1
wages are not too high compared to private sector productivity. When this is true higher
volatility of government revenues reduces national income.
We then extend this model by including a public sector investment in the initial period which
can raise private sector productivity in the second period. Though this may be desirable from
a social point of view it has an immediate unappealing political eﬀect for the incumbent: by
driving up private sector productivity it reduces the gap between public sector wages and returns
in the private sector which makes patronage employment less eﬀective as a tool for influencing
election results. However, we also allow it to have a positive eﬀect since we introduce taxation
of the private sector and since politicians benefit from tax revenues this tends to stimulate
investment. We show that in the plausible case where the return to holding power is large,
patronage employment and public investment are strategic substitutes so when income volatility
increases patronage employment, it simultaneously tends to decrease public investment. This
makes the policy equilibrium even less eﬃcient and induces more channels via which revenues
volatility can reduce national income.
This model therefore produces a new mechanism which can help explain some important
stylized facts. In particular, Ramey and Ramey (1995) first documented that there is a strong
negative correlation between the volatility of output and the rate of economic growth and this
seems well established empirically (see Aghion and Banerjee, 2005, Loayza, Rancière, Servén,
and Ventura, 2007, for overviews of this very large literature). Existing explanations emphasize
the link between volatility and credit constraints (Aghion and Banerjee, 2005, Aghion, Angele-
tos, Banerjee and Manova, 2010). Our model suggests another channel via which volatility may
influence economic growth. Most of the existing evidence looks at the volatility of GDP and in
our model anything which generates income volatility, such as shocks to total factor productivity
or mechanisms that work through aggregate demand, would convert into shocks to the govern-
ment budget via their impact on tax revenues. In our model higher volatility creates lower GDP
per-capita by inducing more wasteful patronage and lower public investment according to the
mechanisms we described above.
But what generates this volatility of government revenues? Where does it come from? Koren
and Tenreyrom (2007) show that output volatility is higher in poor countries (see also Acemoglu
and Zilibotti, 1997) and in many such poor and developing countries most government revenues
come from natural resource rents and natural resources have notoriously volatile prices. Bleaney
and Halland (2010) find that a high share of resources in exports is associated with high economic
and fiscal volatility and low growth. Hence a plausible source of uncertainly in government
revenues come from uncertainly about resource prices. As van der Ploeg (2011) points out,
resource revenues are much more volatile than GDP and he suggests several mechanisms via
which the volatility of resource prices could translate into poor economic performance. For
example, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) argue that commodity price volatility makes
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liquidity constraints more likely to bind and thus reduce innovation and growth. They present
evidence that the adverse growth eﬀect of natural resources results mainly from volatility of
commodity prices, though there are important heterogeneous eﬀects (the impact of volatility is
higher for point-based resources (oil, diamonds); in landlocked, ethnically polarized economies
with weak financial institutions; where there are current account restrictions and when there
is high capital account mobility) (see also van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010). Leong and
Mohaddes (2011) also find robust evidence that it is the volatility, rather than the level of
natural resource rents which is negatively associated with economic growth.
With these interesting empirical connections in mind we then extend our model to take into
account that government revenues may be generated from natural resource rents the price of
which are subject to uncertainly. This is particularly interesting since the revenues generated by
resources in the future depends not just on the stochastic nature of the resource price, but also
on the endogenously derived extraction path. We first show that even when there is no patronage
employment, the path of natural resource extraction determined in a political equilibrium tends
to deviate from the socially eﬃcient (utilitarian) path. Part of the reasons for this have nothing
to do with uncertainty and only with the simple fact that once an incumbent choosing resource
extraction today may not be re-elected in the future, he tends to over-extract resources relative to
the eﬃcient path (Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006, 2014). More interestingly, when resource
extraction is chosen by a politician, rather than a benevolent social planner, the politician
only provides the type of public goods that he and his group value. This implies that future
uncertainty about the resource price creates greater volatility in public good provision (since the
politician does not smooth public good provision across groups like the social planner would)
and this volatility encourages greater extraction in the present. This mechanism leads to even
more resource extraction than would be socially desirable. van der Ploeg (2010) characterized
the socially eﬃcient extraction path under uncertainty, showing that resource extraction in the
present should be higher than when the price is deterministic. We show, therefore, that natural
political economy considerations lead uncertainty to increase resource extraction by even more
than what is socially eﬃcient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up a basic first political
economy model of public income volatility. In Section 3 we apply and extend our framework
to study resource price volatility, resource extraction, and the political economy of the resource
curse. In Section 4 we conclude.
2 A simple political economy model of public income volatility
We consider a society populated by a continuum of voters, with measure normalized to 1. Each
voter belongs to one of two groups, and each group  is of equal size 12 . There is one politician
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from each group, and the politician from group  initially holds power. With a slight abuse of
notation we use the supscript  to denote a voter, a politician, as well as the group the voter or
politician belongs to. A voter  in group  ∈ {} have preferences over a private good  and
a group-specific public good  at each point in time  ∈ {1 2}, with the following per period
utility function:
  =  − 
¡−¢2
2
for  ∈ {}  (1)
with   0 and  ∈ {1 2} denoting the time period. There is no discounting, so total utility is
simply the sum of the per period utilities. This quadratic (concave) specification of the public
good utility introduces a need for public policy smoothing.  is higher the more important is
public goods for utility relative to private goods consumption, and we allow it to diﬀer between
groups. Some groups may put a higher value on, or be in higher need of, public goods provision
than others. Unlike previous literature, we investigate how public sector income volatility aﬀects
political incentives, and equilibrium policy, in such a setting.1
In period  ∈ {1 2} there is public sector income . Future public sector income is uncertain.
We thus assume that 2 is stochastic, and such that 2 = 2 +  with 2  0 and  a random
variable defined on [− ] such that () = 0 and () = 2.2
In the first period, the incumbent politician has to decide on how to allocate public sector
income between his own consumption, public goods, and patronage transfers to individual cit-
izens (through the number of public oﬃces  at a fixed public wage    where  is the
productivity of the private sector). Patronage is not socially optimal, and to capture this in a
simple way we set the productivity in these types of public jobs to zero. At the end of the first
period there is an election. We assume that the election may be aﬀected by patronage. One
simple way to do this is to assume that a politician in power in the future will not fire public
workers from his own group, but will fire public workers from the other group. Then the future
utility of patronage workers is linked to the political success of their patron.3
In the second period, after the election, whichever politician wins takes power. That politi-
cian first decides how much to take away for his own consumption. Then there is the realization
1van der Ploeg (2010) uses a similar specification for the public good utility to analyze the question of optimal
resource extraction. We will return to a comparison between his socially optimal extraction path and the political
equilibrium extraction path when we apply and extend our appoach to deal with resource extraction in Section 3.
2We extend the model to include taxes in Section 2.6.
3There is is an extensive literature discussing how and why patronage may be credible, and may therefore
aﬀect elections. A common element in the part of the literature where voting cannot be observed is that, in one
way or another, a politician can more credibly commit not to fire public sector workers from his own group than
from the other group. There may be many diﬀerent reasons for patronage to groups close to the politician to be
more credible than patronage to groups distant from the politician. These may incude preferences for own group
members, eﬃciency wages, higher costs of firing own group vorkers, the politician resting his leadership on internal
support in his own group, easier monitoring of how own group members vote, etc. For diﬀerent microfoundations
see e.g. Robinson and Torvik (2005), Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006), Robinson and Verdier (2013). The
paticular microfoundaton chosen is not essential for our analysis, and thus we use our reduced form assumption
to simplify the analysis.
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of the public revenues shock. After the realization of the shock to public revenues, provision of
public goods is implemented. This formulation captures in a simple way that shocks to public
sector income aﬀects the provision of public goods, since public policies have to be adjusted to
satisfy the budget constraint after the shocks. This feature, and our assumption that voters
dislike instability in the provision of public goods, will imply a role for price volatility on the
reelection probability of the policymaker.
Since politicians belong to one of the groups, they have the same preferences as other mem-
bers of the group. The per period preferences   of a politician  =  is given by
  =  − 
¡−¢2
2

Here  denotes the politician’s private good consumption, which is determined by how much
public resources the politician appropriates for himself.
The per period budget constraint for a politician  =  in power is
 + + =  − ( +  ) (2)
which says that total expenditure on public goods,  + , plus rent extraction by the politi-
cian, , must be equal to exogenous government income,  minus the wage bill incurred by
patronage employment,  ( +  ).
To find the re-election probability we employ a version of the probabilistic voting model (see
Linbeck and Weibull, 1987, Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Each voter  has an ideological bias
 toward the incumbent politician . Denoting  2() the expected future utility of a voter  if
the incumbent wins, and  2() if the opposition wins, the voter supports the incumbent if
 2() +  +    2() (3)
We assume that  is uniformly distributed at the interval [− 12  12 ] with density   0, and that
 is a random shock aﬀecting the popularity of the incumbent. It is assumed to be uniformly
distributed at the interval [− 12  12 ] with density   0.
2.1 Timing of events and equilibrium
The timing of the game can be summarized as follows.
• The incumbent politician chooses the policy vector ©1  1 1  1  1 ª subject to the
budget constraint (2).
• First period payoﬀs are realized.
• Politicians  compete in the election by non-cooperatively oﬀering policies©2 () 2 () 2 () 2 () 2 ()ª and ©2 () 2 ()2 () 2 () 2 ()ª,
respectively which again must satisfy (2).
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• Whichever politician wins the election takes power and chooses his rent and public em-
ployment.
• There is realization of the revenue shock .
• Second period revenues are realized, and actual public good provision and consumption
takes place for all agents.
Voters realize that for policies to be implemented they have to be ex post optimal for the
chosen politician. Politicians cannot credibly commit to policies which are not in their own
interest. As usual we find the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium, and in the continuation
we thus apply backward induction to solve the model.
A full characterization of equilibrium would specify second period policies for any combi-
nation of the chosen politician and the first period level of patronage employment from both
groups. However, it will become clear below that the incumbent politician  will never oﬀer
public employment to voters from group  (as this is costly and will also reduce his reelection
probability since these voters realize they will only remain in employment should politician 
win the election). Moreover, we have already specified that a politician will not fire workers
from his own group should he win the election, but will fire workers from the other group. For
these reasons we limit attention to situations where 1 = 2 () = 0 and 2 () = 1 .
2.2 Period 2: Credible policies
The politician who wins the election decides post-election policies.
Consider first the case where the initial opposition politician  is elected. There will not
be any patronage employment since such employment is only optimal when there are election
incentives and period 2 is the final period. The politician does not provide public goods to group
 voters, and thus 2 () = 0. His choice of 2 () and 2 () is the solution of the following
program:
max
2 2
2 − 
"¡−2 ¢2
2
#
subject to the budget constraint (2), where () reflects the expectation operator with respect
to the public revenue 2. From the budget constraint the level of public goods provided to his
group is given by 2 () = max
£2 −2 (); 0¤. To simplify the analysis, we will (in a way to
be precisely specified in Assumption A.1 below) only consider regimes in which 2 ()  0 for
all realizations of 2. Given the quadratic utility function on the public good, the problem can
then be rewritten in terms of certainty equivalent as
max
2
2 − 
¡− £2 ()¤¢2
2
−  
2
2
 (4)
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with  £2 ()¤ = 2 −2 ().
The first order condition for an interior solution can be written as:
1 =  ¡− £2 ()¤¢ 
which gives the optimal level of politician ’s rent to be:
2 () = 2 + 1 −
and the level of provision of the public good specific to group :
2 () = 2 − 2 +− 1 
Consider next the case where the initial incumbent politician  is reelected. Using the same
solution procedure as for politician , we find that politician  does not oﬀer public goods to
group  voters and hence 2 () = 0. The optimal level of politician ’s rent is given by
2 () = 2 −1 + 1 − (5)
and the level of group  specific public goods is
2 () = 2 − 2 +− 1  (6)
The following assumptions are suﬃcient to ensure that an interior solution 2()  0 and
0  2()  ,  = , always exists:
Assumption A1:   min
n
1
 ;− 1
o
.
Assumption A2: 2 − 2  − 1 .
Assumption A1 says that second period resource price variations are not too large, ensuring
that the quantity of the type of public good that is provided is always interior (i.e. 0  2() 
). Assumption A2. guarantees that the politician in power always obtains a positive rent (i.e.
2()  0).
Substitution of the above solutions immediately gives the second period expected utility of
private sector voters of type  ∈  when a politician of type  ∈  is in power:
 2() =  − 12 − 
2
2
when  = , and  2() =  − 

2
¡¢2 when  6=  (7)
Private sector voters have their private consumption equal to their productivity  (as for
now there are no taxes). Apart from that term, the expected utility of private sector voters
changes with the identity of the politician in oﬃce. If the politician from the same group as a
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voter wins the election there is a utility gain of 2
¡¢2− 1
2 compared to if the politician from
the other group wins the election. However, in that case the voter also face fiscal volatility that
reduces his utility by  22 .
Too see that the net utility eﬀect of having own politician rather than the other politician
win the election is always positive, first note that the condition for utility to be higher when
own politician is elected is
1
2 + 
2
2
 

2
¡¢2 
which can be reformulated to
2  ¡¢2 − 1
()2 
Taking into account that the maximum possible variance of a stochastic variable with support
on [− ] is 2, a suﬃcient condition for this to hold is
2  ¡¢2 − 1
()2  (8)
At the same time we know from Assumption A1 that   − 1 , so that a suﬃcient condition
for (8) to hold is that µ
− 1
¶2
 ¡¢2 − 1
()2 
which is equivalent to
− 1  0
In light of Assumption A1 this always holds. Thus we have shown that, despite of the cost of
volatility, utility from public goods provision is always strictly higher when a politician from
one’s own group decides policy.
Similar reasoning allows us to derive the expected utility for public employee voters of group
 :
2 () = − 12 − 
2
2
and 2 () =  − 

2
¡¢2  (9)
where the only diﬀerence compared to (8) is that private consumption equals the public wage
 when the incumbent politician  is reelected.
These expressions reflect the asymmetric commitment capacity between the incumbent 
and the challenger . When reelected the incumbent  keeps oﬀering public jobs to his clients
in group . These public positions pay a public wage  which is larger than the private sector
productivity  Conversely, when getting into power, the challenger  has no interest in giving
public sector jobs to any voter as this only reduces what he can get for himself out of the public
budget. Individuals of type  having a public sector job from the incumbent in the first period,
therefore loose some rent  −  when the politician of type  is in power. Their private
consumption is thus higher when their patron wins the election.
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2.3 Period 1: Voters and the reelection probability of the incumbent
We are now in a position to compute the probability of reelection of the political incumbent.
First, for a given realization of his popularity shock , the share of voters from group  that
vote for the incumbent politician  are those individuals for whom
 () +  +    ()
Given (7) this can be reformulated as
  − +
µ
2
¡¢2 − 1
2 − 
 2
2
¶

implying that the share of group  voters that support politician  is given by
1
2
+  − 
µ
2
¡¢2 − 1
2 − 
 2
2
¶

and that the number of group  voters  that supports  is:
 = 1
2
µ
1
2
+  − 
µ
2
¡¢2 − 1
2 − 
 2
2
¶¶
 (10)
Thus, on an expected basis ( = 0), less than half of the group  voters support the incumbent
politician , since when their own politician  wins they enjoy the provision of group specific
public goods.
Proceeding in a similar fashion, the number of private sector voters of group  that support
the incumbent politician  is given by
 = (1
2
− 1 )
µ
1
2
+  + 
µ
2
¡¢2 − 1
2 − 
2
2
¶¶
 (11)
while the number of public employees of group  that support incumbent  is given by
 = 1
µ
1
2
+  + 
µ
2
¡¢2 − 1
2 − 
2
2
¶
+ ( −)
¶
 (12)
The last term in this equation ( − )  0 reflects the rent conferred on public employees
of group  when their incumbent patron is reelected. Obviously, the larger this rent the more
likely such voters will support the incumbent.
The reelection probability of the incumbent  is
Π = Pr
½
 + + ≥ 12
¾

which by inserting from (10), (11) and (12) can be simplified to
Π = Pr
∙
 ≥ − ¡ − ¢ 1
4
µ¡¢2 + 1 − 2
¶
− ( −)1 ≥ 0
¸

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Integrating over  we obtain:
Π = 1
2
+ 
µ¡ − ¢ 1
4
µ¡¢2 + 1 − 2
¶
+ ( −)1
¶
 (13)
There are two noteworthy implications of this reelection probability. First, as expected, it
depends positively on the level of public employment 1 that the incumbent allocates in the
first period to his clients: Π
1
≡ Π =  ( −)  0 (14)
This is related to the asymmetric capacity of the incumbent to propose credibly some public
sector rents to his clients in group . This produces an incumbency bias. Having political power
allows the incumbent to tie the continuation utility of some voters to his own political success.
Second, we see that in general the probability of reelection depends on the volatility of the
resource price: Π
2 ≡ Π2 = −
¡ − ¢ 1
4
 (15)
To see the intuition behind this result, consider the case where the provision of public goods is
more important for group  than for group  voters, i.e.   . We then note that Π2  0.
Conditional on the public good of a group being provided, voters suﬀer a utility loss which is
increasing in the volatility of the provision. This utility loss is higher the more important the
provision of the public good is. Thus, although increased volatility makes the utility of both
voter groups less tied to the political success of their own politician, the fall in support is greater
for politician  than for politician . It follows that the incumbent’s probability of reelection Π
is decreasing in public revenue volatility when the incumbent belongs to the group where public
provision is most needed. If, on the other hand, the incumbent belongs to the group where
public provision is least needed, his election probability is increasing in volatility. This result
captures therefore in a simple manner the fact that revenue volatility has an impact on political
turnover. In this sense, political uncertainty connects to economic uncertainty. We also note
that this connection is stronger the higher is the heterogeneity in preferences between groups,
i.e. the higher is the absolute value of  − .
2.4 Period 1: Policy of the incumbent
Inserting from (5) and (6) into the utility function of the incumbent politician , the incumbent
solves the optimization program:
max
1 1 1
1 − 
¡−1 ¢2
2
+Π
∙
2 −1 + 12 −− 
2
2
¸
+ (1−Π)
∙
−

2
¡¢2¸ 
subject to Π being given by (13), and the budget constraint:
1 +1 = 1 −1  (16)
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The level of provision of the public good specific to group  in period 1 is given by
1 = − 1  0
while the incumbent politician’s rent is
1 = 1 −1 + 1 −  0
The equilibrium level of public (patronage) employment is the solution of the first order condi-
tion:
Π0
µ
2 −1 + 12 −− 
2
2
+

2
¡¢2¶− (1 +Π) = 0 (17)
The solution of this equation provides the equilibrium level 1 of clientelistic public jobs.
The first term Π0
³
2 −1 + 12 −− 
2
2 +

2
¡¢2´ reflects the marginal benefit of
political patronage. It is given by the marginal probability of reelection Π0 associated with a
public job, multiplied by the term in bracket reflecting the utility value for the incumbent of
staying in power in the second period.
The second term  [1 +Π] is the expected resource cost for the incumbent to oﬀer a public
job. As the incumbent commits to public positions while in power, this resource cost has to be
paid in the first period and in expected terms in the second period. The larger the probability
of reelection Π, the larger this cost. At equilibrium the marginal benefit of patronage has to be
equal to its marginal cost.4
2.5 Revenue volatility and policy eﬃciency
We are now ready to investigate the eﬀect of revenue volatility on the political and economic
equilibrium. The following proposition summarizes our first main result:
Proposition 1 Higher volatility in public revenues, that is an increased 2, increases patronage
employment 1 when and only when
2
 +  

  (18)
Proof. We first diﬀerentiate (17) to obtain
1
2 =
−Π0 2 −Π02
2Π0 
Inserting from (14) and (15) we find
1
2 =
 − 2
¡ + ¢
4 ( −) 
4Note that the second order condition for 1 writes as −2Π0 = −2( − )  0 and is therefore
satisfied.
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which is negative when and only when (18) holds.
The proposition shows that when the politician from the group that values publicly provided
goods the highest holds political power, then patronage employment increases with revenue
volatility if policy preferences are suﬃciently heterogenous between groups, and/or if public
wages are not too high compared to private sector productivity. The intuition for this is that,
on the one hand, more fiscal volatility reduces the value to be in power for the incumbent, and
therefore induces a lower level of clientelistic public employment 1 associated to secure such
reelection. On the other hand, however, higher revenue volatility implies a lower future utility
also of the voters in his group if he wins future political power, and thus reduces his probability
Π of reelection. In turn, this reduces the expected cost of public jobs, and promotes the use
of public employment as an instrument of political patronage to push his reelection probability
back up. If the latter eﬀect is the strongest, then patronage employment increases.
A first corollary to Proposition 1 is that:
Corollary 1 Aggregate income in the present decreases with higher volatility if and only if
patronage employment increases.
Proof. The eﬀect on current income 1 =  +1 −1 of increased volatility is given by
1
2 = −
1
2 
and thus increased revenue volatility push current income down if and only if it induces higher
patronage employment.
This corollary shows that the eﬀect on aggregate income from volatility in our basic model
works exclusively through the eﬀect on policy ineﬃciency due to patronage.
A second corollary to Proposition 1 is that:
Corollary 2 When there is no heterogeneity in the valuation of public goods, i.e.  = ,
increased revenue volatility reduces patronage employment.
Proof. This follows by noting that when  =  (18) reduces to    , which is always
true.
Therefore, the possibility of increased policy ineﬃciency with higher revenue volatility is
intimately linked to the polarization of preferences. Moreover, maybe paradoxically, for policy
ineﬃciency to increase with revenue volatility, it has to be the group that values public provision
the most that holds power.
We can also find the eﬀect on total expected aggregate income over the two periods, 1+2,
given by
1 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 2 − (1 +Π)1
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Taking into account that Π is determined by (13), an increase in the volatility gives
 (1 + 2)
2 = −(1 +Π+Π
01 )

1
2 − 

1Π02  (19)
Thus there are two eﬀects from increased volatility on the net present value of expected aggregate
income. First, as above, if volatility stimulates patronage this pulls in the direction of decreased
total income. Second, since higher volatility reduces the reelection probability of the incumbent,
it decreases the likelihood that there is patronage employment in the second period, pulling in
the direction of increased expected total income.5
2.6 Extension: public investment
A possible concern with our basic model is that we assumed the policy space to be restricted
to targeted public goods and ineﬃcient patronage employment. We did not have the possibility
of eﬃcient policies that benefitted the society at large. A key question is if the possibilities of
such policies mean that ineﬃcient policy does not longer prevail, or is weakened, in political
equilibrium. We now turn to this question.
Consider thus the case where the policy space is expanded to include general public invest-
ments  that increase the productivity of all workers in the private sector. Let  denote private
sector productivity in period , which is now given by
1 =  ; 2() =  +  (20)
with   0. We also now take into account that the government can tax the private sector with
some tax rate  ∈ [0 1].
In the second period the budget constraint for a politician  =  in power is
2 +2 +2 = 2 + 2
¡
1− 2 ()
¢−2 () (21)
The budget constraint now captures the fact that taxes 2(1 −  ()) can be collected from
the private sector. In the second period politician  (if in power) as before maximizes (4), but
now subject to the budget constraint (21). This gives the rent to politician  as
2 () = 2 + 2 + 1 −
5Again the eﬀect on income will be negative when the wage gap between the private and public sector is not
too large, since by inserting for Π0, 12 , and Π02 in (19) the condtion for this reduces to
−

3
2
+ 

 − 
 1
4
2 + 1 − 
2

 − 
2

 + 

+ 21 ( −)2  0
which will be fulfilled if    and  − is suﬃciently small.
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and the level of provision of the public good specific to group  as
2 () = 2 − 2 +− 1 
Similarly, if politician  holds power in the second period his rent is given by
2 () = 2 + 2(1− 1 )−1 + 1 −
which captures the fact that 1 public jobs are maintained as a result of political patronage.
The level of group  specific public goods is given by the formula
2 () = 2 − 2 +− 1 
Again we assume interior solutions for public goods provision and rent for all realized values of
2 (as implied by assumptions A1 and A2).
It can easily be seen that utilities of voters are again given by (7) for private sector voters and
by (9) for public employee voters (where in both expressions  is now replaced by (1− )2).
Following the same procedure as in the previous section, one can derive the probability of
reelection of the incumbent politician to be:
Π = 1
2
+ 
µ¡ − ¢ 1
4
µ¡¢2 + 1 − 2
¶
+ ( −2 () (1− ))1
¶
 (22)
As before this probability is increasing in public jobs 1 provided by political patronage.
Interestingly, it is decreasing in the level of general public investment  A higher value of 
reduces the diﬀerence  − 2 () (1 − )) between a public job and a position in the private
sector. This in turn reduces the eﬀectiveness of political patronage, as each public employee
from group  has less to loose when the incumbent is not reelected. As a consequence there is a
lower number of voters of type  supporting the incumbent, and the probability Π of staying in
power is reduced. Thus, other things equal, poverty makes patronage more politically eﬃcient
for the incumbent. And, paradoxically, since the political survival probability decreases with
investment, investing for the future actually shortens the horizon of the politician in the sense
that the future is discounted by more.
The first period problem of the incumbent can now be expressed as:
max
1 1 1 
1 − 
¡−1 ¢2
2
+Π
µ
2 + 2(1− 1 )−1 + 12 −− 
2
2
¶
+ (1− Π)
³
−
2
¡¢2´
subject to 2 being given by (20), Π being given by (22), and the budget constraint
1 +1 = 1 + 1(1− 1 )−1 − 
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Again the level of provision of the public good specific to group  in period 1 can be written as
1 = − 1 
while the rent captured by the incumbent is now
1 = 1 + 2(1− 1 )−1 −  + 1 −
The equilibrium levels of the two remaining variables, public employment 1 and public invest-
ment , are, respectively, determined simultaneously by the following two first order conditions:
− ( + 1)−Π ( + 2) +Π0 [power] = 0 (23)
−1 +Π0 [power] +Π(1− 1 ) = 0 (24)
with
power = 2 + 2(1− 1 )−1 + 12 −− 
2
2
+

2
¡¢2 
capturing the utility value of staying in power for the incumbent. Equation (23) defines the
optimal level of public employment 1 () for a given level of public investment . The marginal
cost of public employment now includes in each period  the public wage  plus the lost
tax revenue  that such a job would have created in the private sector. For the second
period the cost has to be discounted by the probability of reelection Π of the incumbent. The
marginal benefit of political patronage is as before the product of the marginal impact of public
employment on the reelection probability Π0 multiplied by the net utility gain for the incumbent
to remain in power power. This last term now includes tax revenues from the private sector
2(1− 1 ).
Equation (24) defines the optimal level of public investment (1 ) for a given level of public
employment 1 . The first two terms reflect the marginal cost of public investment. The first
term is the resource cost 1 of public investment on the first period budget. The second term
reflects the fact that public investment decreases the probability of reelection (Π0  0), and losing
the election has a cost power for the incumbent. The last term in (24) Π(1−1 ) reflects the
marginal gain to public investment for the incumbent. Investment yields increased tax revenue
(1− 1 ) obtained from productivity growth , and with the probability of reelection Π, the
incumbent can reap the gains from this productivity growth.
Equilibrium patronage and investment
We now investigate how political patronage and public investment relate to each other, before
we turn to the eﬀect of public income volatility on the political economic equilibrium. To find
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the interdependence between patronage and investment we need to investigate the sign of the
variation of 1 () and (1 ). Consider first optimal public employment 1 (). We show in
the Appendix that the sign of 1 () is determined by the sign of the following expression:
−Π ( + 2)−Π +Π0(1− 1 ) +Π” [power]  (25)
Several eﬀects are at play. The first two terms reflect two opposite eﬀects of an increase in  on
the resource cost of public jobs. First, an increase in public investment  leads to a reduction of Π
which decreases the expected cost of political patronage and therefore stimulates the provision
of public employment 1 (the term −Π ( + 2)  0). Second, a higher value of  also
boosts private sector productivity 2 by the factor . As reflected by the term −Π  0, this
increases the opportunity cost of a public job in terms of expected lost tax revenue in the second
period, leading incumbent to reduce his optimal level of 1 .
The third and fourth terms in (25) reflect the impact of  on the benefits of public jobs,
again with two eﬀects pulling in opposite directions. First, an increase in  means higher future
tax revenues and thus makes it more attractive to tilt the reelection probability by increasing
patronage as seen by the term Π0(1−  )  0. On the other hand, however, a higher value
of  makes patronage less politically eﬃcient in terms attracting votes because the income of
private sector employment increases. This makes patronage employment less attractive for the
incumbent, as seen by the term Π” [power]  0
Consider next optimal public investment (1 ). As we show in the Appendix the sign of
(1 )1 is also determined by the sign of (25), now with the following intuition: the first
term reflects the fact that an increase in 1 reduces the value of staying in power by  + 2.
This makes the decrease in the reelection probability induced by investment less costly, and leads
therefore to increased incentives for the provision of . The second term reflects the fact that
a larger value of 1 reduces the size of the private sector, and therefore should the incumbent
win there are less private sector employees to tax, making productivity enhancing investments
less attractive. The third term captures the eﬀect that higher public employment increases
the probability of staying in power, and thus makes productivity enhancing investments more
attractive as the incumbent is more likely to receive the gains of higher taxes. Finally, as shown
by the fourth term, an increase in  makes the reduction in the reelection probability by
investment larger, inducing the incumbent to reduce the optimal level of investment.
Thus in general we have two cases, one where the two variables are positively related to
each other from both of the first order conditions, and one where they are negatively related
to each other. Since what we are concerned with here is countries where political power is
highly attractive, so that power is typically large, we focus on the case where the value of public
income 2 is suﬃciently large to make the term Π” [power]  0 dominate (see the Appendix
for the precise condition for this). In such a case, political patronage and public investment are
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strategic substitutes : an increase in one variable tends to decrease the optimal level of the other
variable. This is shown by the solid curves in Figure 1, plotting the two curves 1 () and (1 )
in the plane (1  ).6 As discussed in the Appendix, we assume for this purpose that the second
order conditions of the incumbent’s maximization problem are satisfied. This implies that the
curve 1 () has a steeper slope than the curve (1 ). The intersection at point  provides the
optimal levels of public employment and investment of the incumbent.
Figure 1 about here.
Revenue volatility and policy eﬃciency
We can now study the eﬀect of revenue volatility on the political economic equilibrium. Again
let us start with political patronage 1 (). In the Appendix we show through diﬀerentiation of
(23) that the curve 1 () shifts to the right with increased revenue volatility when
2
 +  

2 +  
As in the basic model section, when    two eﬀects pull political patronage in diﬀerent
directions. First, an increase of 2 leads to more political turnover, reducing the expected cost
of public jobs for the incumbent, and thus stimulates the expansion of the public sector. Second,
higher price volatility translates into more fiscal volatility for public good provision, and this
reduces the utility value of the incumbent to stay in power, in turn weakening the incentives for
political patronage. Thus again when the polarization of preferences is high relative to the wage
gap between the public sector and the private sector, the positive eﬀect outweighs the negative
one: volatility then leads to more political patronage and the curve 1 () shifts to the right.
Similarly in the Appendix we show by diﬀerentiation of (24) that the curve (1 ) shifts
down if

³
1− 
´
2 + 
³
1 + 
´  1 
On the one hand, as higher price volatility translates into higher political turnover, the
marginal benefit of public investment on expected tax revenues of the second period is reduced
for the incumbent. This tends to reduce the chosen level of public investment by the politician.
On the other hand, an increase in volatility reduces the utility value of staying in power for
the incumbent, and therefore the reduction in reelection probability that investment induces
becomes less problematic for the incumbent, pulling in the direction of increased investment.
When the size of the public sector is not too large compared to fiscal capacity  , and when the
6The case where the two variables are positively related to each other can be studied with a similar figure,
where both curves are upward sloping.
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polarization of preferences is strong, the negative eﬀect of volatility outweighs the positive one,
and an increase in 2 then leads to a reduction of public investment and a thus to a downward
shift of the (1 )-curve.
Under these conditions therefore, the shift in the curves are as drawn by the dotted curves in
Figure 1. The full impact of increased price volatility is to shift the equilibrium policy point from
 to 0. Again, there is increased patronage employment and decreased investment. Moreover,
the increase in patronage stimulates the decrease in investments, at the same time as the decrease
in investments stimulates the increase in patronage employment.
Paradoxically, therefore, in exactly the circumstances where increased volatility reduced
policy eﬃciency in the basic model, extending the policy space to allow for general public
investments that benefit a broad cross section of society actually makes the problem worse.
It is easy to see that such a case is disastrous for national income and growth. Indeed
expected national wealth over the two periods is:
1 + 2 = 1 ¡1− 1 ¢+ 1 +2() ¡1−Π(1 )1 ¢+ 2
Compared to in our basic model it is a simple matter to see that increased revenue volatility
now has three eﬀects pulling 1 + 2 down. First, there is even less private sector employment.
Second, the reelection probability of the incumbent increases compared to that in the basic
model, making it less likely that labor allocation is eﬃcient in the second period. Third, invest-
ment, and thus future productivity, is reduced. For these reasons, increased revenue volatility
may have a strong negative eﬀect on income if institutions cannot prevent politicians from
undertaking patronage employment.
3 Application: volatility and the resource curse
We now extend and apply our approach to study a particular form of public sector income
volatility, namely that related to the extraction of natural resources. We study how price
volatility aﬀects resource extraction, compare this to the social eﬃcient extraction path, and
discuss the interplay between resource extraction, political patronage and price volatility. To
show the new eﬀects this introduces, we first analyze the model without patronage. We then
extend the analysis to include patronage, and show that in such a case volatility may produce
a resource curse both as a result of higher overextraction and more patronage employment.
3.1 Introducing resource extraction
The physical quantity of the resource extracted in the first period is denoted . In the period
after the election there is () left of the resource, with 0  0 and 00  0. The intertemporal
path of prices (1 2) is determined on world markets and taken as given by our small open
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economy. Thus we now have public revenue in period 1 given by 1 = 1, and public revenue
in period 2 given by 2 = 2(). We shall assume that 1 = 1  0 is deterministic and that
2 is stochastic and such that 2 = 2 +  with 2  0 and  a random variable defined on
[− ] such that () = 0 and () = 2. Before the election the incumbent now faces
the problem of choosing the same variables as in the basic model, but in addition has to choose
the path of resource extraction.
Taking into account that 2 = 2(), the reelection probability of the incumbent is now
given by:
Π = 1
2
+ 
µ¡ − ¢ 1
4
µ¡¢2 + 1 − 2()2
¶
+ ( −)1
¶
 (26)
Simple inspection shows that Π0  0 if   , while Π0  0 if the opposite holds. To see the
intuition, consider the case of   . Conditional on having the incumbent in power, voters
of type  suﬀer a utility cost of the fiscal volatility associated with the resource price volatility
(that exceeds the cost faced by voters of type ). This cost is positively related to the stock
of the resource in the second period. As a consequence, quicker extraction in the first period
leaves the voters less exposed to price volatility, and therefore promotes political support for the
incumbent. Specifically, one has
Π0 = −
¡ − ¢ 1
2
2()0()
and
Π002 = −
¡ − ¢ 1
2
()0()
showing that this eﬀect stronger when the volatility parameter 2 is larger.
It should be noted, however, that when    volatility still aﬀects negatively the capacity
of the incumbent to stay in power, since
Π02 = −
¡ − ¢ 1
4
()2
The first period program of the incumbent can now be written as :
max
1 1 1 
1 − 
¡−1 ¢2
2
(27)
+Π
∙
2()−1 + 12 −− 
2
2
()2
¸
+ (1− Π)
∙
−

2
¡¢2¸
subject to Π being given by (26), and the budget constraint
1 +1 = 1−1  (28)
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To provide a better intuition of the diﬀerent eﬀects introduced when resource extraction is
endogenous, we study two versions of this model. First we assume that patronage employment
is not possible, so that 1 = 0. Next we study the case where the incumbent can also use
patronage employment.
3.2 Resource extraction without patronage employment
When 1 = 0 we can, as before, readily compute the optimal interior levels of the incumbent’s
rent 1 = 1 + 1 −  and group specific public goods 1 =  − 1 . More interestingly,
we can now compare the extraction path in the political equilibrium with the socially eﬃcient
extraction path. We first state the main proposition with its proof, before we turn to four
corollaries that trace out and explains the reasons that the two paths diﬀer.
Proposition 2 (i) The political equilibrium path of resource extraction, ∗, is given by
1 + 20(∗)− (1−Π)20(∗)−Π2(∗)0(∗) +Π (power) = 0 (29)
with the net utility value to stay in power for the incumbent
power = 2(∗) + 1
2 −− 
2
2
(∗)2 + 

2
¡¢2 
(ii) The socially eﬃcient path of resource extraction is given by
1 + 20( )− 

2 ( + )
2( )0( ) = 0 (30)
Proof. The optimal extraction path from the point of view of the incumbent is given by the
derivative of (27) with respect to  (taking into account 1 = 0, (26) and (28)), which gives the
following first order condition:
1 +Π (power) +Π ¡2 − 2()¢0() = 0 (31)
The second order condition for an optimum is given by:
 = 2Π0
£2 − 2()¤0() +Π £2 − 2()¤00()−Π20()2 +Π00 (power)  0
that we assume to be satisfied.7 Rearranging (31) yields (29), which proves part (i).
To see part (ii), denote by  total private consumption in the economy at time  = 1 2.
Note that since utility is linear in private consumption, all possible distributions of a given
amount of private consumption between agents yields the same total utility. Therefore, without
loss of any generality, when we consider the utilitarian social welfare function we can restrict
7The three first terms on the right hand side are all negative. Thus a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition
for this is that Π00  0 so that the fourth term is also negative.
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ourselves to deal with total private consumption in each period, and not its distribution between
diﬀerent agents in society. Given this, and given that the mass of voters in each group 
equals 12 , the social welfare function, denoted , is given by:
 = 1+1
2
Ã
−
 ¡−1 ¢2 +  ¡−1 ¢2
2
!
+
Ã
2 + 1
2
Ã
−
 ¡−2 ¢2 +  ¡−2 ¢2
2
!!

The resource constraints are given by
1 +1 +1 = 1 and 2 +2 +2 = 2() (32)
The socially eﬃcient policy is found by maximizing  with respect to©1 1 2  2 12ª subject to (32) (and the requirement that 2 must decided
before the realization of the price shock 2).
It is straight forward to find that the provision of public goods between groups  and  is
such that
 = − 


¡− ¢   = 1 2
i.e. that the group that values the public goods the most will also receive the highest provision.
Inserting this, and inserting from (32), the maximization program can be reformulated as
max
1 2
µ
1−1 −+ 


¡− ¢¶−  ¡ + ¢4 ¡−1 ¢2
+2 −
Ã ¡ + ¢
4
¡− £2 ¤¢2 − 4 ( + )2()2
!
 (33)
subject to
 £2 ¤ =  +  (2()−2) +  −  + 
The first order conditions for 1 , 2 and the extraction path  are:
1 = 
¡−1 ¢
2

1 =

2
¡− £2 ¤¢  (34)
and
1 + 

2
¡− £2 ¤¢ 20()− 2 ( + )2()0() = 0 (35)
Inserting from (34) in (35) we obtain the characterization of the eﬃcient extraction path 
given by equation (30), which proves part (ii) of the proposition.
A first corollary to Proposition 2 is that in the political equilibrium the politician in power
discounts the future too much:
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Corollary 3 Assume there is no resource price volatility (2 = 0). Then the political equilibrium
features overextraction of resources compared to the socially eﬃcient extraction path, i.e. ∗   .
Proof. When  = 0 (29) and (30), respectively, rewrite as:
1 + 20(∗) = (1−Π)20(∗)  0
and
1 + 20( ) = 0
Since Π  1 the corollary follows.
This corollary shows that political uncertainty makes the politician bias the extraction path
towards the present, and resembles the result of Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006, 2014) that
there is overextraction of natural resources in political equilibrium. This result is of course a
simple version of the results we discussed in the introduction where the presence of elections
induces political incumbents to discount the future too highly.
A second corollary to Proposition 2 is that:
Corollary 4 When there is resource price volatility (2  0), the socially eﬃcient extraction
path is tilted towards the present.
Proof. This follows by noting that when 2  0 we have from (30) that
1 + 20( ) = 

2 ( + )
2( )0( )  0
This corollary resembles the van der Ploeg (2010) eﬀect, which shows how the optimal
Hotelling rule of resource extraction needs to be modified when the future resource price is
volatile. In particular, he finds that price volatility should bring forward the eﬃcient resource
extraction path, and Corollary 4 is a version of his result. We note that the higher the volatility,
and the stronger the preference for the provision of public goods,  and , the more the
socially eﬃcient extraction path shall be tilted towards the present.
To see how we extend the previous literature on price volatility and the resource extraction
path, we now move on to the next corollaries, which compare the extraction path in the political
equilibrium with the socially optimal extraction path. The following corollary introduces a first
main insight:
Corollary 5 Consider the case of symmetric preferences, i.e.  =  ≡ . Then when
()00() + 0()2 ≤ 0 the extent of overextraction is higher the higher is price volatility, i.e.
the higher is 2.
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Proof. When  = , this immediately implies that Π = 0 and that Π = 12 . Inserting
this and  =  ≡ , (29) and (30) can be written, respectively, as
1 + 20(∗)− 1
2
20(∗)− 1
2
2(∗)0(∗) = 0
and
1 + 20( )− 1
4
2( )0( ) = 0
Thus the condition for resource extraction in the political equilibrium to increase more than
the social optimal extraction reduces to
−2(∗)0(∗)  −( )0( ) (36)
Thus this will always hold provided ∗ is not too high compared to  . Moreover, if
()00() + 0()2 ≤ 0 this always hold since in this case we have that |(∗)0(∗)| ≥¯¯( )0( )¯¯.
To see the main intuition behind this corollary, note that a social planner will smooth future
price volatility between the two groups of voters since they both will have positive provision
of public goods. In a political equilibrium, by contrast, only one of the groups will receive
public goods, and thus price volatility generates higher volatility in provision for the group that
happens to be in power. As a consequence, since volatility is not smoothed across groups, future
volatility is more costly. Thus, when volatility increases, resource extraction is tilted towards
the present by more than what is socially optimal. This eﬀect is captured by the term 2 on the
left hand side of (36).
There are also two additional eﬀects. One the one hand, as captured by the terms (∗) 
( ) in (36), the fact that resource extraction is higher in the political equilibrium than in the
social optimum means that in political equilibrium less resources are left for the future. Thus
in political equilibrium a lower resource stock is exposed to volatility, and therefore increased
volatility is less costly than in social equilibrium. As a consequence, higher volatility increases
extraction less today than in the social eﬃcient extraction path. On the other hand, there is an
eﬀect captured by the terms −0(∗)  −0( ). In political equilibrium the marginal amount of
resources gained in the future if extraction today is reduced is higher than in social equilibrium.
When volatility increases, the marginal value of future resources thus decreases most in the
political equilibrium, pushing down extraction today by more in the political equilibrium than
in the social equilibrium. In the special case where ()00() + 0()2 = 0, these two latter
eﬀects cancel, and only the first remains, which explains why in this case higher resource price
volatility always increases overextraction.
Turning finally to the case of asymmetric preferences, i.e.  6= , we have:
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Corollary 6 Consider the case of asymmetric preferences, and let   . Then from (29)
the term Π (power) becomes positive.
(i) This increases overextraction in political equilibrium even more.
(i) Provided 2 is not too high initially, this increase in overextraction increases in 2.
Proof. Part (i) follows directly as the left hand side of (29) has now become higher.
To see part (ii), note that the derivative of the term Π (power) with respect to 2 is given
by
Π2 (power) +Π12(
∗)2
which by inserting for Π2 and Π exceeds zero if
2(∗) + 1
2 −− 
2(∗)2 + 

2
¡¢2  0
which is always satisfied provided 2 is not too high.
The intuition for part (i) is that when the group that values public goods the most has
power, then greater resource extraction in the present increases the probability of holding future
political power, since it implies a lower volatility cost for the voters which is stronger for group
 voters than for group  voters. This increases overextraction even more as compared to the
symmetric case.
The intuition for part (ii) is that, on the one hand, a higher volatility decreases the value
for the politician of future political power. Since it becomes less important for him to win,
his incentive to extract more today to secure future political power has become weaker. On
the other hand, however, higher volatility also means that voters have become more responsive:
higher extraction today increases the probability of reelection by more when volatility is high.
This pulls in the direction of higher extraction, and given that the rents of power are suﬃciently
large, which they are if 2 is suﬃciently low, this eﬀect always dominates. In that case, the
increase in overextraction is increasing in 2, as stated in part (ii) of the corollary.
Thus, even in the absence of political patronage a political economy model of price volatility
brings novel and interesting eﬀects for resource extraction. Further interesting implications
follow when we also allow resource extraction to interact with political patronage, a topic to
which we now turn.
3.3 Extension: resource extraction with patronage employment
In this extension, to focus on the most interesting interactions between resource extraction
and patronage employment, we investigate the case of asymmetric preferences, and thus again
assume that   .
With patronage 1  0 the corresponding first order conditions for 1 and  are:
− (1 +Π) +Π0 (power) = 0 (37)
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1 +Π (power) +Π ¡2 − 2()¢0() = 0 (38)
with
power = 2()−1 + 12 −− 
2
2
()2 + 

2
¡¢2 
Equation (37) defines a political patronage curve 1 (). As shown in the Appendix, the eﬀect
of the resource extraction rate  on  involves two eﬀects. First, it increases the probability
of reelection and therefore increases the expected resource cost of political patronage. Second,
it reduces the net value of staying in power for the incumbent. For both reasons the incentives
of the incumbent to oﬀer public jobs are reduced, and political patronage is consequently a
negative function of the extraction rate. This relationship is depicted as the solid curve 1 ()
in Figure 2.
Similarly equation (38) defines the extraction rate curve (1 ). An increase in 1 has also
two eﬀects. First, a higher value of 1 reduces the incumbent’s value to stay in power (as the
wage bill to be paid on the public budget is increased). This in turn weakens the incentive to
push resource extraction up to increase the election probability, and therefore reduces  Second,
more political patronage increases the time horizon of the incumbent and therefore makes him
more likely to keep resources for the next period. Hence, the eﬀect of political patronage on the
extraction rate is negative. This relationship is depicted as the solid curve (1 ) in Figure 2.
The equilibrium policies can be represented as before in the space ( 1 ) in Figure 2, at
point  where the two solid curves intersect.
Figure 2 about here.
Price volatility and the resource curse
The eﬀect of price volatility on the equilibrium values of  and 1 is obtained through diﬀeren-
tiation of (38) and (37). In the Appendix we show that (for given extraction) volatility increases
patronage when the public wage gap is not too large, and the 1 ()-curve then shifts to the
right. Again the eﬀect of volatility on extraction (for given patronage) makes the (1 )-curve
shifts upwards provided the volatility is not too high.
The induced eﬀect of 2 on the equilibrium policies are described by the dotted curves in
Figure 2. Inspection shows immediately that at least one of the variables increases, and quite
possibly (as drawn in the figure) they both increase. In that case extraction and patronage
employment both increase with higher price volatility.
It is straight forward to verify that in the case where both extraction and patronage em-
ployment increase, total income decreases both as a result of a worse extraction path and as a
result of increased patronage employment. Thus in this case we have a resource curse for both
25
reasons. In case one of the variables decrease, the total eﬀect on income is uncertain (see the
Appendix).
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed a model of the political consequences of public income volatility
which to our knowledge has not previously been researched. As is standard, political incentives
create ineﬃcient public policies in our model, but we also show that making income uncertain
creates specific new eﬀects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy
more eﬃcient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent
and since some of the policy ineﬃciencies are concentrated in the future, this makes ineﬃcient
policy less costly. We show how this model can help think about the connection between volatility
and economic growth and in the case where volatility comes from volatile natural resource prices,
a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself is a source of
ineﬃcient resource extraction. These results are in addition and complementary to those of
van der Ploeg (2010) who showed how uncertainly about natural resource wealth increases the
socially eﬃcient extraction rate.
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6 Appendix
In this Appendix we provide derivations and analysis referred to in the diﬀerent sections of the
main paper.
6.1 Appendix to Section 2.6
• The curves 1 () and (1 ):
The 1 ()-curve is defined by (23), and diﬀerentiation of (23) gives:
1 ()
 =
−Π ( + 2)−Π +Π” [power] +Π0(1− 1 )
2Π [ + 2]
=
(1− ) ( + 2)1 −Π − (1− ) [power] +  [ −2(1− )] (1− 1 )
2Π [ + 2] 
Similarly the (1 )-curve is given by (24), and diﬀerentiation of this provides:
(1 )
1
=
(1− ) ( + 2)1 −Π − (1− ) [power] +  [ −2(1− )] (1− 1 )
−2Π0(1− 1 )

The denominator in both of these expressions is positive (which is also a requirement for the
second order conditions of the maximization problem to be fulfilled), and thus the sign of the
expressions is determined by the numerator (which naturally is the same in both expressions
since it is the cross derivative of the maximand). The numerator in the expressions is negative
when
power  ( + 2)1 − Π(1− ) +
µ 
1−  −
¶
(1− 1 )
Since we are interested in resource abundant countries where the value to remain in power is
high, we assume this to be fulfilled (for instance due to 2 being suﬃciently large). The slope
of the curves is then negative (and the second order condition requires the 1 ()-curve to be
steeper then the (1 )-curve as depicted in Figure 1).
• Impact of volatility on the 1 ()-curve:
Diﬀerentiation of (23) with respect to 1 and 2 (for given  = ) shows that the horizontal
shift in the 1 ()-curve is given by
1 ()
2 =
−Π2 ( + 2)−Π0 2
2Π [ + 2] 
where the denominator is positive. Inserting in the numerator for Π2 and Π0, the sign of the
numerator and the horizontal shift is positive when
 ¡ − ¢ 1
4
( + 2)− ( −2(1− ))

2
 0
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which reduces to
2
 +  

2 +  
Hence, for a given level of investment, volatility increases patronage (all else controlled for) when
the heterogeneity in preferences is suﬃciently high, and then the 1 ()-curve shifts to the right.
• Impact of volatility on the (1 )-curve:
Similarly diﬀerentiation of (24) with respect to  and 2 (for given 1 = 1 ) shows that
the vertical shift in the (1 )-curve as a result of higher volatility is given by
(1 )
2 =
Π2(1− 1 )−Π0 

2
−2Π0(1− 1 )

where the denominator is positive, and the sign of the vertical shift is negative when the numer-
ator is negative, which after substituting for Π2 and Π0 holds when
− ¡ − ¢ 1
4
(1− 1 ) + (1− )1 

2
 0
which reduces to

³
1− 
´
2 + 
³
1 + 
´  1 
The left hand side is decreasing in  (as   1), and in the simple case where only group 
voters care for public goods the condition simply reduces to   1 . Hence public investment
declines with 2 when the size of public employment is not too large compared to fiscal capacity
 .
6.2 Appendix to Section 3.3
• The curves 1 () and (1 ):
The 1 ()-curve is defined by (37) and diﬀerentiation provides:
1 ()
 =
−Π +Π0
¡2 − 2()¢0()
2Π0  0
Similarly the (1 )-curve is defined by (38) and diﬀerentiation provides:
(1 )
1
=
−Π0 +Π0
¡2 − 2()¢0()
−  0
where the sign follows from Π0  0 and Π0  0. We assume that the second order conditions
are fulfilled, which implies that the 1 ()-curve is steeper than the (1 )-curve as depicted in
Figure 2.
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• Impact of volatility on the 1 ()-curve:
Diﬀerentiation of (37) with respect to 1 and 2 (for given  = ) shows that the horizontal
shift in the 1 ()-curve is given by
1 ()
2 =
−Π2 −Π0 2 ()2
2Π 
where the denominator is positive, and the sign of the horizontal shift depends on the sign of
−Π2| {z }
+
−Π0 22()
2| {z }
−

which after substituting for Π2 and Π0 is positive when
 ¡ − ¢ 1
4
()2 − ( −)

2
()2  0
which reduces to
2
 +  

 
Hence, for a given level of extraction, volatility increases patronage (all else controlled for) when
policy preferences are suﬃciently heterogenous between groups, and/or if public wages are not
too high compared to private sector productivity, and then the 1 ()-curve shifts to the right.
• Impact of volatility on the (1 )-curve:
Similarly diﬀerentiation of (38) with respect to  and 2 (for given 1 = 1 ) shows that
a suﬃcient condition for the (1 )-curve to shift upwards with higher volatility is that price
volatility is not too strong.
Total income over the two periods is again given by
1 + 2 = 2 + 1+ 2()− ¡1 +Π(1 )¢1
and the derivative for 2 gives
 (1 + 2)
2 =
£1 + 20()¤ 2 − h1 +Π+Π01 i 12 
As there is overextraction of the incumbent [1 + 20()]  0, and obviously when  and 1
increase the eﬀect on income is negative. If one of the variables decreases, then in general the
eﬀect cannot be signed.
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